Dr. Zafer M. Alajmi
To be a Gulf military means to be foresighted not watcher towards the military events in Yemen that Gulf troops involved in. The basic conclusions which can be attained owing to the launching of ballistic missile of the type "TOSHKA" by the units of Yemeni Republican Guard on "Safir" camp in Marib killing 45 Emiratis, 5 Bahrainis, 32 Yemenis, and 10 Saudis, these conclusions includes facts must be accepted, citing these facts does not mean a criticism to our heroes in Yemen war, including:
- Intelligence: The incident showed that we are in need for intelligence and scout efforts focus on the potential threat, and establishing an early warning, and creation of deterrence mechanism around the centering of Gulf land troops, and the need for creation a buffer zone around each camp of Gulf troops with distance equal to the range of ground-to-ground missiles owned by the enemy. The incident has shown that the failure of scouting and intelligence lies in our failure to indemnify for the negligence of analysis of the capacity in the regional neighborhood for many years. The worst is that the air superiority of Arab Coalition was to deprive the enemy of all forms of scouting, because we possess better means of handling, as well as superior battle monitoring system compared to the enemy.
- Military Security: Information was spread on Facebook shows an image of a person among the Gulf arms in "Safir" camp, it is said that the coordinates of the camp has taken from that location . Sources also said that what happened was a result of betrayal by soldiers had declared loyalty to the legitimate, but they still owe to the enemy with loyalty. Whatever the cause of the martyrdom of our heroes, however, they were certainly in a hostile environment requires preventive measures by the security men in the camp which maintain security against hostile acts.
- Rules of engagement: When the number of casualties in a unit exceeds the normal proportion, leaders must pause to scrutinize the rules of engagement; did we restrict our men with complicated conditions while setting to an engagement to form a restricted target for the enemy? or that we gave them ultimate license in the fieldwork , hence the state of alertness in "Safir" camp decreased ? Was overcrowding near magazines within the mobilization orders? So the rules of engagement of Houthis/Saleh especially in ground-to-air missile system were heavy and outdated that we could defeat them by the anti-missile air defense system with a mixture of local defense systems and electronic warfare and scout systems, then setting goals and launch direct strike against the ballistic missiles. We don’t doubt that the origins of the rules of engagement of the Gulf military obtained from nobility of Islam which does not know treachery, and Gulf military committed to this origins prior abiding by legal, military, strategic, political, and operational dimensions of the "Rules of engagement" , but the volume of the disaster requires reconsideration . We have noticed that the most important strategic estimation forums wrote after the martyrdom of our sons in Yemen, critique within specific scope , accompanied by praise and appreciation for Gulf troops due to its deployment over far distances "Power projection" without facilities from the hosting State , with no secured camps , and no good sea and air ports , but in a hostile environment made vulnerability one of our weak points . Preparing for war , carrying out it , and ending it are subject unavoidable errors , as wars have surprises cannot be seen before it occur due to the fog of war as the strategist Klaus Fitz said . God have mercy on our martyrs who are nobler than us all.